

## Message Text

SECRET

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:WBSMITH:DEF  
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY  
NEA:NAVELIOTES  
S/S- FWISNER

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O 180050Z MAR 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: NSC, MARR, XF, IS

SUBJECT:SOUTHERN LEBANON: ISRAELI REQUEST FOR UNSC DELAY  
SUBJ: SOUTHERN LEBANON: ISARIEL REQUEST FOR UNSC DELAY  
1. SUMMARY. DINITZ CONVEYED TO THE SECRETARY REQUEST FROM  
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BEGIN THAT THE SECRETARY RECEIVE DAYAN SUNDAY EVENING TO  
HEAR NEW ISRAELI PROPOSALS AND THAT U.S. MEANTIME SEEK DELAY  
OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING OR AT LEAST DELAY IN ANY VOTE.  
THE SECRETARY AGREED TO RECEIVE DAYAN BUT EXPLAINED WALDHEIM  
HAD JUST ADVISED HIM COUNCIL WOULD MEET IN AFTERNOON AND IN  
ALL LIKELIHOOD OVER WEEK-END AS WELL. THE SECRETARY FELT  
NEED FOR TABLING OF RESOLUTION TO COUNTER ARAB RESOLUTION.

DINITZ SAID BEGIN ASKED THAT U.S. NOT TABLE ANY RESOLUTION. THE SECRETARY AGREED TO GET WORD BACK TO DINITZ WHETHER U.S. FELT SECURITY COUNCIL SITUATION COULD BE CONTAINED UNTIL MONDAY. THE SECRETARY RELATED WALDHEIM WAS PREPARED TO MOVE UN FORCE INTO SOUTH LEBANON RAPIDLY. SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HERE BELIEVED USSR WOULD NOT OPPOSE IT IF LEBANON WANTED IT. THE SECRETARY ASKED IF ISRAEL HAD ANY FORCES NORTH OF LITANI, WHICH WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS, AND DINITZ AGREED TO CABLE INQUIRY PROMPTLY- DINITZ WAS INFORMED AFTER MEETING ON THE SECRETARY'S BEHALF THAT IN U.S. JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SLOW DOWN SECURITY COUNCIL OVER WEEK-END. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR DINITZ CALLED AT HIS URGENT REQUEST ON THE SECRETARY MARCH 17 TO CONVEY MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. BEGIN REQUESTED THE SECRETARY AGREE TO RECEIVE FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN IN WASHINGTON IN EVENING OF SUNDAY MARCH 19 SO THAT DAYAN COULD PRESENT CONCRETE ISRAELI PROPOSALS RE SOUTHERN LEBANON. BEGIN FURTHER REQUESTED THAT IN MEANTIME U. S. DO ALL IN ITS POWER TO DELAY CONVENING OF SECURITY COUNCIL. REASON ISRAEL REQUESTED DELAY WAS THAT THIS MATTER CONCERNS LIFE OF ISRAELI CITIZENS AND ISRAELI PROPOSALS TO BE TRANSMITTED TO THE SECRETARY WERE VERY SERIOUS. BEGIN IN MESSAGE NOTED THAT ISRAEL HAD ALREADY INDICATED ITS READINESS TO WITHDRAW FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON, BUT IF IN U.S. OPINION ADDITIONAL ISRAELI STATE-SECRET

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MENT WAS NEEDED TO FACILITATE DELAY OF SECURITY COUNCIL UNTIL AFTER SUNDAY, ISRAEL WOULD ISSUE ONE.

3. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT UNSYG WALDHEIM HAD JUST TELEPHONED HIM, SAYING THAT HE HAD MET LAST NIGHT WITH LEBANESE, SYRIAN, AND KUWAITI REPRESENTATIVES, AND THAT SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD MEET THIS AFTERNOON. FURTHERMORE, IT WAS WALDHEIM'S VIEW THAT OTHERS WOULD INSIST THAT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE CONTINUE OVER WEEKEND AND THAT BRITISH SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT WOULD BE UNABLE TO PREVENT THIS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT RATHER THAN LET ARAB RESOLUTION BE PUT TO A VOTE WE SHOULD TABLE OUR OWN RESOLUTION.

4. DINITZ SAID MESSAGE FROM BEGIN ADDED THAT IF COUNCIL DEBATE BEFORE SUNDAY WAS UNAVOIDABLE, ISRAEL REQUESTED THAT U. S. ABSTAIN FROM SUBMITTING RESOLUTION OF ITS OWN. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE ANOTHER FRIENDLY POWER TABLE RESOLUTION, BUT AVOIDANCE OF ANY RESOLUTION WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT.

5. DINITZ CONTINUED THAT FROM TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS HE

HAD HAD IN MORNING WITH BOTH BEGIN AND DAYAN, IT WAS CLEAR THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT SIMPLY TRYING TO WIN 24-HOUR RESPITE. ISRAEL NEEDED VIABLE LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO PROBLEM, AND FOR THIS PURPOSE ISRAEL AND US. NEEDED TO PUT HEADS TOGETHER AT HIGHEST LEVEL THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD REVIEW SECURITY COUNCIL SITUATION WITH U. S. REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK, BUT HE WOULD HATE TO SEE ARABS PUT THROUGH CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION. DINITZ WONDERED IF MODERATE ARABS MIGHT NOT HELP. LEBANON DID NOT SEEM ANXIOUS FOR RESOLUTION FOR ITS OWN SAKE BUT EVIDENTLY WANTED VIABLE SOLUTION.

6. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WANTED TO POSE FRANK QUESTION: DID NEW ISRAELI PROPOSALS PROVIDE FOR PROMPT ISRAELI WITH-SECRET

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DRAWAL? DINITZ SAID HE DID NOT KNOW, ALTHOUGH HIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED ITS PROPOSALS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT.

7. THE SECRETARY RELATED THAT WALDHEIM HAD IN MIND FOUR BATTALIONS OF 3,000 MEN AND VERY RAPID TRANSFER OF TROOPS FROM SINAI TO SOUTHERN LEBANON. DINITZ ASKED IF SPECIAL U4SC RES. WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THIS, WHICH THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT WALDHEIM WOULD LIKE RESOLUTION PERMITTING UN TROOPS TO CARRY ARMS AND SHOOT IN SELF-DEFENSE. THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS SYRIA MIGHT GO ALONG WITH UN FORCE IN SOUTH LEBANON. DINITZ ASKED IF U.S. CONTEMPLATED INTRODUCTION OF LEBANESE FORCE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED U.S. HAD ALWAYS BEEN IN FAVOR OF THAT, BUT AS ALWAYS, LEBANON WAS UNSURE HOW SOON IT WOULD BE ABLE TO DO IT. DINITZ THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE EASIER FOR LEBANON NOW, WITH WHICH THE SECRETARY AGREED. THE SECRETARY ADDED IT WOULD HELP CREATE LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL PRESENCE IN AREA.

8. DINITZ INQUIRED ABOUT SOVIET ATTITUDE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WHILE BOTH DOBRYNIN AND TROYANOVSKIY WERE UNINSTRUCTED, BOTH BELIEVED THAT IF LEBANON WANTED UN FORCE PLACED IN SOUTH, USSR WOULD NOT OPPOSE IT. DINITZ ASKED IF COMPOSITION OF FORCE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WALDHEIM HAD SAID USUAL MIX WOULD BE NECESSARY AND HE THOUGHT IT WISE TO START FROM SINAI WHERE COMPOSITION HAD GENERAL APPROVAL.

9. DINITZ SUGGESTED THAT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES U.S. SAW LITTLE VALUE IN FRESH ISRAELI STATEMENT ABOUT READINESS TO WITHDRAW. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WOULD DEPEND ON TEXT; IF STATEMENT POSED CONDITIONS, IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO ISSUE IT. IT WAS NOTED TO DINITZ THAT IF U.S. SOUGHT TO SECRET

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DELAY THINGS IN SECURITY COUNCIL BECAUSE OF IMPENDING TALKS WITH DAYAN, U.S. WOULD BE ASKED WHETHER DAYAN'S PROPOSALS PROVIDED FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL.

10. DINITZ AND THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THEIR RESPECTIVE AMBASSADORS IN NEW YORK WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH EACH OTHER. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THIS TIME SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE FOR LONG TERM COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH UN ON SOUTH LEBANON PROBLEM. DINITZ SAID ISRAEL SHARED THIS HOPE AND DID NOT WANT TO KEEP ISRAELI FORCES THERE. THE SECRETARY ASKED IF ISRAELI FORCES WERE NOW NORTH OF LITANI AND COMMENTED THAT THIS WOULD BE TERRIBLY DANGEROUS. DINITZ PROMISED TO CABLE IMMEDIATELY FOR ANSWER AND SAID ISRAEL

SHARED U.S. CONCERN THAT SYRIAN-ISRAELI CLASH MUST BE AVOIDED. DINITZ ASKED TO BE INFORMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER U.S. JUDGED THAT VOTING IN SECURITY COUNCIL COULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL MONDAY.

11. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED DINITZ ON THE SECRETARY'S BEHALF TO SAY THAT AMBASSADOR YOUNG HAD JUST CONFIRMED TO THE SECRETARY THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO SLOW DOWN SECURITY COUNCIL OVER WEEK-END. ISRAELI POSITION OF CONDITIONAL READINESS TO WITHDRAW WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE DELAY.

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**Concepts:** POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, UNSC RESOLUTIONS, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 18 mar 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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**TAGS:** PDIP, MARR, PDEV, MOPS, XF, IS, UNSC, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (BEGIN, MENAHEM),  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014